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A Minor Jurisprudence of Spectacular War: Law As Eye in the Sky
Abstract
The 2016 film, Eye in the Sky (Eye), features contestation among lawyers, politicians, and military personnel
as to law’s values, meanings, and consequences. In other words, Eye is animated by jurisprudence. As
jurisprudence, Eye represents contemporary drone warfare as a highly regulated legal system structured
around an ethical valuing of civilian life. Given that drone warfare is known yet secret, by rendering drone
warfare vivid and visible, what legal system does Eye construct, which jurisprudential questions are asked, and
which are occluded? Drawing on scholarship relating to minor jurisprudence, and spectacular war, this essay
argues that Eye dazzles us with technology, and an acute questioning of law, to distract us from first,
concealments and erasures accompanying drone warfare, and second, a legitimation of the controversial
international law principle, responsibility to protect. In the process, by rendering visible a particular set of
actors, narratives, and questions, while concealing and erasing others, Eye legitimises drone warfare and
valorises its actors, institutions, practices, and technologies.
This journal article is available in Law Text Culture: http://ro.uow.edu.au/ltc/vol21/iss1/12
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1. Questioning Law
Gavin Hood’s 2016 film, Eye in the Sky (Eye), opens on a scene of 
familial warmth and domestic togetherness. Words on the bottom left 
corner of the screen inform us that the place is Kenya, and the time 
is 7 am. We are introduced to a little girl, Alia, in the outdoor space 
of her family’s very simple home; a home that appears to have been 
built out of scavenged and somewhat makeshift materials. The space 
is adjacent to an outdoor oven. Alia’s mother sets bread into this oven 
with a baking peel. The parents have calm loving demeanours and use 
endearments when speaking to the child. Alia stands next to her father 
who is putting the finishing touches to a hoop that Alia receives with 
excitement. ‘Go play’, her father instructs her. Alia spins and twirls 
inside the hoop with an entrancing, lyrical grace. Then the camera 
moves up and away to show us a jarring contrast: on the other side of 
the cinder block wall separating the family’s compound from the street, 
men in camouflage uniforms stand in a jeep with a machine gun set on 
a tripod,1 patrolling the neighbourhood. 
Mirroring the act of surveillance but discarding its brute militarism, 
and surpassing the limits of the human eye, the camera moves further 
up to show us an eye in the sky – a drone. Crosshairs, which ‘endow the 
spectatorial eye with the symbolic function of a weapon’ (Stam 1992: 
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104), appear on the screen. As viewers, we understand this aiming, 
framing visual device as a signifier of the drone’s seeing: precise, 
calibrating, factual because mechanical. The film’s opening lays the 
ground for the viewing appeal of a very contemporary technofetishism2 
alongside Alia’s archetypal innocence. This opening presages the film’s 
compelling narrative tension: Alia is likely to be ‘collateral damage’3 
if a missile is launched at a room occupied by terrorists loading two 
suicide vests with explosives. But if Alia is not risked (sacrificed?) and 
the terrorists subjected to a targeted killing, a minimum of 80 civilian 
deaths is the probable result.
With lives at stake, we watch elite, mid- and low-ranking American 
and British state actors – military personnel, cabinet ministers, the 
British Attorney General, the Senior Legal Advisor to the U.S. 
National Security Council – as the decision is made to conduct the 
targeted killing. In the process, against the urgency of a ticking bomb 
scenario,4 these various lawyers, politicians, and military personnel 
express competing values and understandings of law and reality. 
If jurisprudence is philosophy of law, and ‘the philosophical 
questions which are asked about legal systems’ (Davies 2002: 2), then 
the contestation around law and values animating Eye might be seen 
as an expression of jurisprudence. When informed by a postmodernist 
suspicion of grand narratives and entrenched categories, jurisprudence 
involves ‘critique of established, conventional, and naturalised patterns 
of thought’ (Davies 2002: 255). Minor jurisprudence, the concept and 
provocation that our essays collectively engage, is especially suspicious 
of ‘the complacency and status or establishment of law’ (Goodrich 
1996: vii). By problematizing disciplinary distinctions, canon, and 
‘interpretive naïveté’ (Minkinnen 1994: 357, 358), and by dwelling on 
‘the sites of [law’s] passage or contact with an ‘outside’ world’ (Goodrich 
1996: vii), minor jurisprudence participates in critique’s larger project: 
‘[a]chieving lasting conceptual change, and therefore a change in how 
the world is constructed materially’ (Davies 2002: 255). 
As jurisprudence, Eye represents contemporary drone warfare as 
a highly regulated legal system structured around an ethical valuing 
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of civilian life. Eye’s jurisprudential texture has led one reviewer to 
characterise the film as ‘interlac[ing] a thriller with a courtroom 
drama’.5 In featuring law alongside the enticements of ‘cool weaponry’, 
and ‘the glamorization of gadgetry’ (Stahl 2010: 66, 68), does Eye 
represent a minor jurisprudence of spectacular war? As Roger Stahl 
explains, with spectacular war, rather than a political, social, and 
media environment that ‘work[s] through appeals, explanations, and 
justifications to a citizen acknowledged to be in a decision-making 
position’, a discourse is produced ‘that dazzles the citizen subject into 
a submissive, politically disconnected, complacent, and deactivated 
audience member’ (Stahl 2010: 20). Given that drone warfare is unseen,6 
yet known and secret (Masco 2014: 134),7 by rendering drone warfare 
vivid and visible, what legal system does Eye construct? And in framing 
and asking a particular set of philosophical questions of law, what does 
Eye exclude and occlude? 
The concept of minor jurisprudence lends itself to delving into these 
questions because minor jurisprudence is attuned to ‘concealment and 
erasure, the means of their effectuation, and attempts not simply to 
criticize but to depart from them’ (Tomlins 2015: 251). Drawing on 
minor jurisprudence, my essay asks, what does Eye conceal and erase? 
How does the highly sensory and affective8 platform of a fictional film 
become the vehicle for the political disengagements of spectacular war? 
Briefly, my essay argues that this critically acclaimed film, featuring 
a gripping plot, a nuanced script, and stellar performances, dazzles us 
with first, technology, and second, an acute questioning of law and legal 
systems, to distract us from two troubling corollaries of drone warfare. 
These corollaries are, first, de-democratizing and dehumanizing 
concealments and erasures that accompany drone warfare; and second, 
a re-making of lawful authority, and of nation-state sovereignty, 
through a dramatization of the (highly contested) international law 
principle, responsibility to protect. In the process, by rendering visible a 
particular set of actors, narratives, and questions, while concealing and 
erasing others, Eye legitimises drone warfare and valorises its actors, 
institutions, practices, and technologies. If the gap between legality 
and legitimacy is one that plagues modern law (e.g., Fitzpatrick 2001), 
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particularly in the context of anti-democratic politics (e.g., Kirchheimer 
1932, 1933; Fraenkel 1941; Diab 2015), then Eye is a jurisprudential 
text that illuminates popular culture’s role in scripting and securing 
legitimacy for new forms of legality.
2. Law As Spectacle
The assessment of Eye as part courtroom drama9 is both unsurprising 
and ironic. If the analytic category ‘spectacle’ is understood as ‘a still 
prevalent mode of mediated politics that invites the citizen into a 
position of voyeuristic complacency’ (Stahl 2010: 16), then the spectacle 
of something very like a courtroom drama is indeed generated in that 
Eye features lawyers;10 hierarchies of authority;11 rules of procedure;12 
and dynamics of adversarial argument in which precedent,13 rights14, 
and law are invoked. This performance of rational legal authority’s 
familiar features suggests perhaps that ‘the rightness of the political 
order’ (Schuerman 1996: 6, drawing on Weber 1922) is intact.
However, Eye departs from the standard courtroom drama15 in 
two important ways. First the role of ‘witness’ is (primarily) scripted 
for machines. With our weaponised spectatorial eye (Stam 1992: 104) 
framed by a range of differently marked crosshairs, we see what the 
various drones show us. Indeed, the film’s plot and pace is quickened 
when the tiny, discreet (and therefore fascinating) beetle-shaped drone 
reveals two suicide vests being loaded with explosives. In Eye, what 
the drones show us operates like the incontrovertible facticity of proof 
in a courtroom drama; a facticity of seeing that distracts us from the 
questions that are, in Nasser Hussain’s words, eclipsed.
[T]he accuracy of the drone’s eye structures more than vision; it shapes 
how we think about, talk about, and evaluate a bombing. We focus 
in on the target, the moment of impact. We dispute how contained 
or collateral the damage was, how many civilians died alongside the 
chosen target. These questions begin to eclipse all other questions 
about the global military apparatus that makes the strike possible or 
about civilian injury that goes beyond body counts (Hussain 2013).
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The global military apparatus that makes the strike possible relates 
to the second key departure from the genre of courtroom drama: 
events do not unfold in a single courtroom, nor is the contestation 
enacted primarily between legal professionals. Instead, the ‘courtroom’ 
is a technologically networked space across many sites, and military 
personnel are principal advocates. Two sites for this networked 
courtroom are in England. Colonel Powell runs the operation from 
Basement Three of the Permanent Joint Head Quarters in Northwood. 
The room has no windows but a large wall of screens, and a team of 
her military subordinates operating computers and electronic devices 
too complicated for us to understand. On the wall of screens however, 
we see what they see on their various screens, as well as images relayed 
from other sites around the world. Everyone in this room wears an 
army uniform.
The second English ‘courtroom’, mimicking perhaps a superior 
court, is the beautifully appointed Cabinet Offices Briefing Room 
A. This venue has the slightly sinister acronym COBRA. Sunlight 
streams through large windows perpendicular to a wall equipped 
with a screen. Only one person in this room wears a uniform: Colonel 
Powell’s superior, Lieutenant General Benson. Benson sits at the head 
of a conference table along with the Attorney General, the Minister of 
State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, and Angela Northman,16 
the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State Responsible for Africa; the 
one woman17 in the room. On their wall of screens, these elite actors see 
the same images on the wall of screens in Colonel Powell’s Basement 
Three room; images which include those relayed from drones managed 
by the U.S. pilots sitting in the industrial-looking metal box in Nevada 
that is their ground control station. When the Senior Legal Advisor on 
the U.S. National Security Council calls in from the White House, we 
see her on these walls of screens. When the British Foreign Secretary 
calls in from Singapore to ask, ‘Gentlemen, what action is being legally 
recommended?’ we see him on these walls of screens too. 
In spilling beyond the container of a courtroom, Eye dramatizes 
planetary jurisdiction; representing perhaps the 9/11 Commission 
257
A Minor Jurisprudence of Spectacular War: 
Law As Eye in the Sky
Report’s assertion, ‘the American homeland is the planet’ (2004: 
362).18 In connecting events and people across four continents – Africa, 
Europe, North America, and Asia – Eye shows us something of what 
this means. As a corollary of planetary jurisdiction, just as the military 
officers, politicians, and lawyers in the film invest trust in images on 
screens relayed from multiple places, our (spectator-consumer) sense 
of the total picture comes from watching. The single screen that we 
watch repeatedly multiplies into the film’s many screens. Eye is a film 
that mirrors our act of watching such that the familiar tropes of liberal 
legality become entwined with spectatorship and virtualisation. With 
Eye, images, ‘the equivalent of an ammunition supply’ in industrialised 
war (Virilio 1989: 1), eclipse key issues (Hussain 2013) even as they 
shape our understanding of law, and law’s questions.
If spectacular war ‘dazzles the citizen subject into a submissive …
deactivated audience member’ (Stahl 2010: 20), then the spectatorship 
and virtualisation19 of watching Eye is like looking into a befuddling 
set of many ref lecting mirrors: we engage in spectatorship and 
virtualisation; the film shows us others engaging in spectatorship 
and virtualisation; and the film convinces us that a transnational 
technological network of spectatorship and virtualisation is central to 
the functioning of a secretive form of warfare imperative to our safety. 
Part of what dazzles us into submissive acceptance is the message that 
the technological apparatus and nation-state alliances of drone warfare 
and the ‘war on terror’ is all too complex for any single, civilian, non-
expert individual to comprehend. In its geographic scope alone, the 
film convinces us of a spatial and technological complexity beyond 
our grasp. In short, technology’s capacity to almost-instantaneously 
span space and time, alongside the dynamics of spectatorship and 
virtualisation, become part of the enmeshments of technofetishism, 
law, and spectacular war inherent to Eye. 
3. Responsibility to Protect
Despite its apparent delivery of courtroom drama, Eye replicates the 
post-9/11 environment by discarding legal and judicial processes and 
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institutions tied to liberal democracies (e.g., Diab 2015; Rajah 2014; 
Rajah 2016). Instead, an alternative legal system is represented. This 
legal system is populated by social actors relevant to a militarized civil 
sphere (Lutz 2009) and the counterterror state (Masco 2014), and 
unfolds in sites other than courtrooms. Coherent with this alternative 
legal system, regulatory force lies with kill lists, rules of engagement, 
and collateral damage estimates. In this alternative legal system, it is 
military and counterterrorism personnel (not lawyers, and certainly 
not politicians!) who can be trusted to be protective of innocence, and 
ethical in their decision making. In short, Eye convinces us that the 
experts able to meet the demands of planetary jurisdiction are military, 
technological, and counter-terrorism experts operating beyond the 
sphere of nation-state sovereignty. 
In dramatizing a form of international administration ‘premised 
upon the separation of title to and control over territory in the 
decolonised world’ (Orford 2011: 199), and in its depiction of the 
spaces, technologies, and expertise of contemporary global security, 
does Eye narrate and legitimise the controversial international law 
concept, responsibility to protect?20 
Conceptually, the responsibility to protect asserts that the lawfulness 
of authority – both local and international – flows from the factual 
capacity and willingness to guarantee protection to the inhabitants 
of a territory. This argument for the lawfulness of authority does not 
prioritize self-determination, popular sovereignty, or other romantic 
or nationalist bases for determining who should have the power to 
govern in a particular territory. Rather, it asserts that authority, to be 
recognized and respected, must be effective in guaranteeing protection 
(Orford 2012: 29).
In its depiction of an urgent desire to protect Alia while also 
protecting the probable 80 civilian victims of a double suicide 
bombing, Eye tells the story of a decolonised nation-state with the 
factual incapacity to guarantee protection to its inhabitants. In Eye, 
the territory in which the targeted killing will take place is, technically, 
Kenya. But the film vividly portrays a failure of Kenyan territorial 
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sovereignty: Alia’s family lives in a neighbourhood controlled by al-
Shabaab extremists in which all the inhabitants we see appear to be 
Somali refugees and al-Shabaab militants. Presumably, all who occupy 
the space are biologically, visibly, and culturally marked as somehow 
belonging such that outsiders are, by their very appearance, immediately 
identifiable as trespassers.
So stark is the territorial exclusion that the Kenyan army commander 
liaising with Colonel Powell instructs a Kenyan intelligence operative 
not to endanger himself by entering that space. At a point of entry as 
concrete as any walled and barbed-wired national border, the Kenyan 
intelligence agent who has followed suspects from the airport, to a 
pleasant Nairobi residential neighbourhood, turns away once those 
suspects enter the al-Shabaab controlled area. Once the car carrying 
the known al-Shabaab leaders and the newly arrived young men – 
one U.S. national, the other a U.K national – enters the al-Shabaab 
controlled area, drone surveillance reveals, as the passengers leave the 
car and enter the building next to Alia’s home, that Susan Danford is 
among the passengers. Danford is the terrorist who is a British national 
and the prime target of Powell’s initial capture mission. On spotting 
Danford, Colonel Powell immediately asks the Kenyan commander 
to find a way to ‘put a man on the ground’. The man who is sent is a 
Somali working with Kenyan intelligence. 
In keeping with the border that excludes Kenyans from this 
space, those in control rule in a manner that expresses a very specific 
relationship between territory, authority, and forms of law. Al-Shabaab’s 
law, we are shown early in the film, takes the form of extra-legal 
executions: a restless Colonel Powell rises from her bed at 4:15 am to 
watch, in her study, a video clip of al-Shabaab shooting to death a bound 
intelligence operative who had been working with the Kenyan-Anglo-
American alliance. Al-Shabaab’s law also takes certain extremist forms 
repressive of women. This extremism is conveyed in an early moment in 
the film in which we see a bustling marketplace. As if out of nowhere, 
a young woman’s exposed wrists (her sleeves conceal three-quarters of 
her arm) are hit by a disciplining stick. The man policing the space and 
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the woman, is simultaneously interrogating and accusing, ‘Why aren’t 
your wrists covered’? We are shown that he wears an army uniform 
and the woman complies with his demand that she leave the public 
space of the market.
Coherent with this narrative strand on the repressive policing 
of women, a customer seeking Alia’s father’s bicycle repair skills 
chastises Alia’s father when she, a child intent on play, picks up her 
hoop and starts circling within it. Immediately afraid, apologizing to 
the customer, her father stops her. Once the man is safely beyond the 
wall, her father warns Alia; explaining, exclaiming, ‘These people are 
fanatics. Never play in front of them’! One of the ways in which Alia’s 
family is sympathetically portrayed to us (a ‘Western’ audience) is that 
Alia’s parents do what they can to give Alia an education; instructing 
her surreptitiously in their home, hiding her books under sofa cushions 
when there is a risk that the books might be seen by a stranger. In this 
territory which is simultaneously Kenyan yet not Kenyan, as long as 
she is dressed in a certain way, Alia can safely be in public, as a girl 
and a child, to sell bread, but she cannot safely be seen to play, nor can 
she safely be seen to be acquiring literacy and numeracy. 
Through the enforcement of certain forms of repression, and 
through the vigilance and violence of men – some armed and in 
uniform – we are shown that Kenyan territory harbours those who 
threaten the lives of Kenyans (the probable targets in the prospective 
shopping-centre suicide bombing), and those who, in different ways, 
threaten Alia’s capacity to grow into the kind of adult who, as Nan 
Seuffert notes,21 represents the hope for a liberal, democratic future. In 
short, the law at work in this territory is not Kenyan. In keeping with 
the logics of responsibility to protect, the lawfulness of international 
authority over this territory flows from the factual incapacity of the 
Kenyan state to ‘guarantee protection to the inhabitants of the territory’ 
(Orford 2012: 29). 
4. Women Who Lead; Women Who Serve
Crucially however, just as responsibility to protect is inherently neo-
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colonial in its logics, ideology, and operations (Orford 2011), Alia’s 
vulnerability also seems in troubling continuity with colonial ideologies. 
Drawing on Spivak, Seuffert highlights that, as a vulnerable, brown, girl-
child, Alia perpetuates the colonial justification of ‘white men saving 
brown women from brown men’ (Spivak 1988: 297). Indeed, the post-
9/11 context has ‘re-vitalised Orientalist tropes and representations 
of backward, oppressed and politically immature women in need of 
liberation and rescue through imperialist interventions’ (Zine 2016: 
21).
Alia’s sacrifice (she is the single instance of ‘collateral damage’ 
that we are shown) draws attention to the roles assigned to women in 
this film. The operation is led by a woman, Colonel Powell, and the 
a-typical terrorist, Susan Danford, is an English woman that Powell 
has pursued for six years. At one level, these roles render race irrelevant; 
pitting English women against each other such that the vile terrorist is 
a foil to the virtuous warrior. But to what extent do the roles of woman 
warrior and woman terrorist function to mask the patriarchal cultures 
and violence of two belligerent institutions: the army, and extremist 
terrorism? Possibly, the leadership assigned to women works in Eye by 
‘fram[ing] militarism to appeal to viewers historically the most resistant 
to the military: women’ (Vavrus 2013: 92). 
The casting of women as leaders takes on a second troubling 
dimension: in different ways, both Powell and Danford play a part in 
killing a girl child.22 Symbolically, does Eye suggest that women who 
lead are rendered somehow murderous? Both Powell and Danford are 
depicted as directing their activities to taking life. There is a troubling 
misogyny at work in the way Powell and Danford mirror each other as 
threats to Alia. Augmenting the tainting of women as leaders in Eye 
is the fact that Angela Northman, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary 
of State Responsible for Africa, the only woman present in COBRA, 
is the person who speaks the single most cynical and power-serving 
sentiment uttered in this film. Bearing in mind that this is a film replete 
with self-serving utterances (primarily from politicians and lawyers), 
it is this one woman in COBRA who suggests that perhaps they, (the 
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decision-makers) should do nothing to prevent the suicide bombing, 
saying, ‘Politically, I’d rather point to al-Shabaab as murders of 80 
people shopping than have to defend a drone attack by our forces that 
killed an innocent child’. Her savvy assessment of what the Attorney 
General characterizes as ‘the propaganda war’ leaves the room shocked 
and silent for a few moments. 
In contrast to the women who lead, in Eye, the women who serve 
(for example, Carrie Gershon, the sensor operator who works alongside 
Steve Watts in the Nevada Ground Control Station, Lucy Galvez, the 
woman who conducts the image analysis from Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, 
Alia’s mother, the women who buy bread from Alia in the market) do 
not endanger life. Misogyny in Eye takes on a sinister but subtextual 
form; fronting women in power as emblems of a desirable gender 
equality even as it suggests that power de-humanizes women.
In summary, by establishing the failure of the Kenyan state to 
protect first, its own population from suicide bombings, and second, 
girls and women from the misogyny of al- Shabaab, the stage is set for 
the (Western, imperial) rescuing mission of responsibility to protect. 
Responsibility to protect legitimises international executive rule when 
‘the lawfulness of authority – both local and international – flows 
from the factual capacity and willingness to guarantee protection to 
the inhabitants of a territory’ (Orford 2012: 29). Accordingly, under 
the terms of responsibility to protect’s moral internationalism (Orford 
2013), a British-led military and intelligence operation, in collaboration 
with the US and Kenya, is a lawful expression of authority. In the fabric 
of minor jurisprudence woven by Eye, responsibility to protect becomes 
a convincing, compelling feature of the alternative legal system central 
to our contemporary perpetual war.
5. Spectacular Concealing
Given the potency of spectacular war and technofetishism in Eye, 
it is ironic that much of the critical acclaim for the film centres on its 
representation of deliberation.23 This acclaim fails to notice that should 
these debates occur off screen, between lawyers, politicians, and the 
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military, we, as publics, would not be aware of them because the legal 
system of the counterterror state features secrecy as ‘a core tool’ and ‘an 
ever-expanding practice’ (Masco 2014: 128). With Eye, the explicitly 
jurisprudential script almost acts like a decoy. The characters’ shared 
abhorrence for taking an innocent life, and the consequent contestation 
around law, liability, and responsibility, distracts us from a larger 
discourse of concealing that the film participates in.
This concealing is easy to miss for two reasons. First, the 
authenticating affect of ‘fact’ threads through Eye in a range of ways: the 
actors playing Alia and her parents are actual Somali refugees;24 Susan 
Danford’s character is probably based on British national, Samantha 
Lewthwaite, characterised by the British tabloid press as ‘terror 
fugitive’ and believed to be behind certain terrorist attacks in Kenya;25 
director Gavin Hood’s and writer Guy Hibbert’s numerous interviews 
with military officials inform the script;26 the script draws on British 
procedure for drone strikes on its citizens detailed by The Economist,27 
and on leaked U.S. secret documents published on the website ‘The 
Intercept’.28 Additionally, the Permanent Joint Headquarters in 
Northwood,29 and Creech Air Force Base,30 are actual U.K. and U.S. 
military facilities; and Eye’s depictions of drones have been assessed as 
realistic, with ‘a lot of cutting edge tech’.31 The invocations of actual 
military facilities, and the assessment that the cutting edge tech is 
realistic, suggest that like other films of ‘militainment’,32 Eye has been 
made with the cooperation of state militaries (see also Vavrus 2013).
A second reason that the dynamic of concealing is elusive in Eye 
is that, in appearing to show us what states won’t reveal, and in the 
dynamics of spectatorship and virtualisation, visibility stands in for 
transparency.33 The distinction between visibility and transparency 
points to a crucial difference between the courtroom trial and Eye: 
the courtroom is, in general, a public space. The visibility of events in 
a courtroom expresses the principle that law must have the capacity to 
scrutinize power, and hold power accountable. In Eye however, law’s 




If visibility stands in for transparency in the mainstream visual 
culture of the ‘war on terror’ (Kennedy 2012), it is important to note 
that spectacles of concealing are also achieved when Eye shows us 
secrecy in terms of space, and relatedly, in terms of law’s record. With 
the Basement Three command centre, COBRA, Creech Air Base, and 
the Image Analysis Unit, we enter highly secure state spaces from which 
publics are excluded. When Colonel Powell briefs the Americans, 
she instructs them that the mission is classified top secret. When the 
suicide vests become visible and Alia’s proximity puts her at risk, the 
politicians demand assurances that secrecy will be maintained and 
that there is no risk of a video of the drone strike leaking and being 
posted on YouTube. 
Joseph Masco highlights that secrecy, when acquiesced to by 
a public, engenders a de-democratizing ‘conspiratorial subtext to 
everyday life … [with] collective assumptions about the secret state’ 
(Masco 2014: 128; Dean 2002). In reviewing scholarship on secrecy 
and contemporary U.S. imperialism, Masco writes,
Chalmers Johnson … point[s] out that the CIA term blowback 
addresses not only the retaliatory consequences produced by U.S. covert 
actions at home and abroad but also the damaging domestic effects 
of secrecy. Since U.S. covert operations are by definition unknown 
to U.S. citizens, actions taken around the world in response to them 
are literally unintelligible to U.S. citizens. Secrecy works here in a 
doubled fashion to enable state actions that might not be supported if 
they were subjected to public debate while at the same time denying 
citizens a means of understanding the long-term political effects of 
U.S. global activities. In a counterterror state, blowback has several 
additional perverse effects: since U.S. citizens have no insight into 
U.S. covert actions around the world, retaliatory acts appear to 
the American public as without context and thus irrational. And 
given that the premise of the War on Terror is that a ‘terrorist’ is an 
irrational and inherently violent being who is dedicated to destroying 
the United States, blowback empowers yet another level of American 
misrecognition and fantasy: namely, that the United States is only a 
global military actor when provoked by irrationally violent attacks. 
(Masco 2014: 133-134.).
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In keeping with the American misrecognitions and fantasies 
engendered by secrecy, Eye reproduces dominant U.S. discourse 
on terrorism in two important ways. First, the terrorist violence in 
Eye is presented as without cause or context, and, second, with one 
exception, the terrorists are cardboard figures conforming to identity 
stereotypes. The (very) slightly less cardboard figure is the gender and 
racially a-typical terrorist, Susan Danford. When briefing the American 
members of the team, Colonel Powell explains Danford as someone who 
had ‘a troubled childhood’, converted to Islam at 15, and met the man 
she married, a British national of Somali descent, in a West London 
mosque. Danford’s story is sketched out in this very skeletal way. Apart 
from a brief moment of explanation for the terrorist violence offered 
early in the film when, along with Powell, we watch the video news clip 
on al-Shabaab’s summary execution of the intelligence agent,34 there 
is no effort to explain or contextualise al-Shabaab, the British Somali 
who is married to Danford, or the readiness to don suicide vests of the 
two very young men (so young as to be on the cusp of childhood); one 
who grew up in the U.S., the other who grew up in the U.K. 
In decontextualizing contemporary terrorists and terrorism, Eye 
also perpetuates the ‘war on terror’ trope that terrorists are ‘evil, 
barbaric, and inhuman while America and its coalition partners are 
… heroic, decent, and peaceful – the defenders of freedom’ (Jackson 
2005: 59).35 In Eye, none of the state actors is portrayed as fuelled by 
racism, righteous nationalist rage, or in the way of the Iraq War, by 
a heavy metal soundtrack (Pieslak 2009). Instead, with self-serving 
politicians, and responsibility-avoiding lawyers as foils, the film 
portrays military and counterterrorism personnel as the most ethical, 
selfless, and heroic among the dramatis personae. Dismantling the 
notion that drone warfare engages a distancing, de-humanising optic, 
the two young U.S. air force officers in their Nevada ground station 
are shown to be intimately invested in protecting and saving Alia. 
Colonel Powell, and her superior, General Benson, make the decision 
to conduct the strike, despite the risk to Alia, because of the greater 
number of innocent lives at stake should they not pre-empt the suicide 
bombings. We are shown that making these decisions, and operating 
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the technologies that surveil and kill, thoughtful, likeable individuals 
are burdened and distressed. By the end of the film, the mission is 
accomplished, but there is no celebration. 
When it comes to concealing, given that the dominant discourse 
on drone warfare is already one-sided and myopic (Hussain 2013), 
it becomes important to ask, what experiential dimensions of drone 
strikes does Eye represent? A brief consideration of the soundscape of 
the film offers a troubling detail.
In his influential essay, A Phenomenology of Drone Strikes (2013), 
Nasser Hussain draws attention to ‘the chronic and intense harm 
continuous strikes wage on communities’. Consistent with the troubling 
silences and erasures that mark debates in the US on drone warfare 
(Hussain 2013; Masco 2014), the soundscape of Eye does not include 
the ‘terrifying buzz of a distant propeller’ those on the ground hear 
when drones are visible (Rohde 2012). Instead, Eye portrays the 
surveilling, bomb-bearing drone as unobtrusively silent, while the 
smaller drones we see whirr and click so subtly as to be unnoticed by 
those who are being recorded and relayed. However, Eye’s soundscape 
does feature a powerful moment of silence. Mirroring perhaps the fact 
that ‘[d]rones fire missiles that travel faster than the speed of sound 
[such that a] drone’s victim never hears the missile that kills him’ 
(Rohde 2012), when a missile strikes the room with the suicide bombers 
and their al-Shabaab handlers, we see Alia falling to the ground, her 
parents rushing to look for her, embodying fear and grief. We see, in 
this striking silence, devastated bodies and buildings. For an intense 
few seconds, the film’s sound is, eloquently, the sound of silence. In 
this silence we witness Alia’s parents’ despair, and experience our own 
wordless distress at the slaying of innocence.
The distress of the young US drone pilots, and the concern of the 
UK elites to avoid the problem of killing Alia while also managing 
the imminent suicide bombings, is entirely humanised by the film’s 
images, narrative, and soundscape. What Eye conceals is the role of 
silence in facilitating an ‘aura of detachment … [that] eases the ability 
to kill’ (Hussain 2013) inherent to the drone’s technology of sight 
without sound,
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‘In the case of drone strike footage, the lack of synchronic sound 
renders it a ghostly world in which the figures seem unalive, even before 
they are killed. The gaze hovers above in silence. The detachment that 
critics of drone operations worry about comes partially from the silence 
of the footage (Hussain 2013).
The soundscape’s deceptive slippages discount the terror experienced 
by communities subject to drones. When this sonic deception is 
deployed alongside the authenticating affect of fact, Eye augments the 
distortions marking U.S. dominated perceptions of the full effects of 
drones.
To summarise, in Eye’s minor jurisprudence of spectacular war, 
the responsibility to protect is taken seriously by an international 
administration populated by those who care. They care both for 
the vulnerable child Alia, but also for us: the spectator-subject. As 
audiences, we stand in for innocent, ignorant publics who might step 
into shopping centres in the course of a mundane weekend; vulnerable 
in our routines to death by terrorist attack. In the affective terrain 
of Eye, the secrecy and disproportionate power of that international 
counterterror administration seems legitimate and desirable; thus 
strengthening the fabric of a minor jurisprudence of spectacular war.
6. Conclusion: A Minor Jurisprudence of Spectacular War
In the penultimate moments of Eye, we join the film’s state actors in 
witnessing two forms of killing: targeted assassination and collateral 
damage. Liam Kennedy argues that the execution of violent state 
power ‘enacted as shock and awe, as high technological interventions in 
foreign terrains, with the use of drones’ works in tandem with collateral 
damage (2012: 265). He writes,
[T]hese forms of violence are linked in the visual culture of perpetual 
war: in different yet closely related ways they signify the naturalization 
of preemptive violence as the right and might of the state. They also 
assert the powerful sovereignty of the state, for such violence creates 
its own interpretive conditions and so suspends the ethical and legal 
conventions of response to its enactments’ (2012: 265).
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As audiences – mediatised spectator-subjects – in a culture of 
spectacular war, what understanding of state sovereignty do we receive; 
what interpretive conditions are created; and what ethical and legal 
conventions are suspended by the violence we witness? In the course 
of this essay, I have argued that the arc of Eye’s narrative legitimates an 
expansive, secretive transnational state power exercised through drone 
warfare. Drone warfare is an especially de-democratizing technology of 
war (Gusterson 2014: 203), while the responsibility to protect renews 
and re-vitalises neo-colonial operations and ideologies of international 
executive rule (Orford 2011). Within the dazzling expanse of planetary 
jurisdiction, spectacular technology becomes justifiable, if not necessary, 
in an archetypal battle between good and evil. Liberal legality is 
undone alongside liberal democracy and nation-state sovereignty when 
the film valorises military and counterterrorism sites and personnel 
as responsible protectors of vulnerable transnational populations. In 
Eye, contemporary war’s apparently borderless operations demarcate a 
form of planetary jurisdiction in which targeted killings and collateral 
damage must necessarily, justifiably, occur in distant places, upon 
distant, uncounted, bodies.
As an apparently non-state text engaging the complications of 
affect, portraying Alia and her family as very real, very likeable people, 
Eye appears to attend to margins and the marginal; a marker of minor 
jurisprudence (Goodrich 1996). Through the mimicking of courtroom 
drama, Eye appears to undo political polemics and interpretive naiveté; 
to illuminate that which has been concealed and erased – further 
markers of minor jurisprudence (Minkinnen 1994; Tomlins 2015). If 
however, we reject visibility as a species of transparency, and disentangle 
ourselves from the enticements of technofetishism, it becomes possible 
to look beneath and beyond Eye’s spectacle to perceive its spectacular 
concealing: this film shows us highly undemocratic, unaccountable, and 
imperial forms of sovereign power. In Eye, law, rules, and procedure 
become masks for a recalibrated legal system in which fundamentally 
philosophical questions about drone warfare, the ‘war on terror’, and 
the nature of citizenship remain unasked. Sovereignty’s tentacles 
appropriate marginality, affect, and a non-sovereign text to reproduce, 
in insidious and troubling ways, a jurisprudence of majority.
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1. The tripod – a piece of equipment common to photography and to war – 
visually invokes (at least) two associations: first, Susan Sontag’s well known 
assessment that ‘[e]ver since cameras were invented in 1839, photography 
has kept company with death’ (2003: 24); and second, the history of film 
in which ‘[t]he precursor to the Lumieres’ moving picture camera was 
Etienne-Jules Mary’s chronophotographic rifle, which both resembled 
and was inspired by a machine gun’ (Stahl 2010: 8; Virilio 1989: 15). The 
weapon on a tripod in these opening moments is visually echoed when, 
later in the film, a camera is set on a tripod so that the young men recruited 
to be al-Shabaab suicide bombers can record suicide videos.
2. Technofetishism is ‘the worship of high-end weaponary …ascribing 
weapons an inherent virtue or beauty [and] positioning military hardware 
at the center of the television war drama’ (Stahl 2010: 28). Technofetishism 
is a key attribute of spectacular war, discussed below.
3. In delving into the dehumanizing, ‘actuarial’ (2012: 273) logics of the 
language of ‘collateral damage’, Liam Kennedy argues that collateral 
damage is ‘a form of violence that is supplementary and incidental to the 
sensational violence of shock and awe’, and that ‘[a]cross US mainstream 
visual culture, shock and awe and collateral damage are dominant frames 
in visualizations of the war on terror. They ideologically parse death and 
suffering by delineating those who count as fully human and those who 
do not’ (2012: 265).
4. The ticking bomb scenario has been characterized as ‘one of the most 
vexing issues of the torture debate’; a scenario that has been deployed to 
justify torture, and the discarding of legal safeguards for suspects and 
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detainees ‘when the public is in danger’ (Lokaneeta 2011, 61). With Eye, 
there is a deft transplantation of the ticking bomb scenario from the 
torture debate to the uncertainties surrounding the limits on, and scrutiny 
of, state power in drone warfare. This transplantation is troubling for the 
way it deploys fear and posits a state omniscience relating to the future. 
The arc of Eye’s narrative legitimates an expansive, secretive, state power 
in drone warfare through the compelling need to protect innocent publics 
by preventing the unfolding suicide bombings.
5. https://ww2.kqed.org/arts/2016/03/18/a-war-seen-in-unnerving-close-
up-from-eye-in-the-sky/ 
6. Unseen, that is, by those of us in the global North. Drone warfare has 
been used principally in Yemen, Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan and Somalia 
(Gunneflo 2016: 177). Artist Mahwish Chishty paints drones both as 
seeing – with stylized eyes decorating the drone as object – and as their 
shape appears to those on the ground: mahwishchishty.com
7. Officially, within the U.S., drone warfare occupies the paradoxical space of 
known but secret in its details. Jane Mayer (2009) draws attention to the 
distinction between the publicly acknowledged military’s drone program 
and the covert CIA-run program ‘aimed at terror suspects around the 
world’ in which ‘the intelligence agency declines to provide any information 
to the public about where it operates, how it selects targets, who is in charge, 
or how many people have been killed’. The use (or non-use) of drones is 
a ‘classified fact’ permitting the CIA to deflect Freedom of Information 
Act requests (Masco 2014: 134). 
8. Affect, once understood as broadly equivalent to ‘emotion’, has come, in 
contemporary scholarship, to be understood as ‘the name we give to those 
forces – visceral forces beneath, alongside, or generally other than conscious 
knowing, vital forces insisting beyond emotion’ (Seigworth and Gregg 
2010: 1). The affect of a fictional film like Eye includes narrative, image, 
sound, suspense, celebrity culture and technofetishism.
9. https://ww2.kqed.org/arts/2016/03/18/a-war-seen-in-unnerving-close-
up-from-eye-in-the-sky/ 
10. The lawyers in the film are British Attorney General, the Senior Legal 
Advisor to the U.S. National Security Council, and a British army lawyer 
with the rank of Captain. The contestation between these various state-
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affiliated lawyers distracts us from the absence of the voice of a non-state 
lawyer in the role of defence counsel. 
11. Hierarchy is of course an entrenched feature of the common law. 
Hierarchies of authority are explicit with the film’s military personnel 
but it is also striking that, in an ironic mirroring of the military chain of 
command, the lawyers and the politicians keep ‘referring up’ in an effort to 
deflect responsibility and make others responsible for a difficult decision.
12. These rules are dramatized as a core feature of military and counter-
terrorism operations. It is the sight of the suicide vests that precipitates the 
urgent debates around law because the mission’s authority was for a capture 
rather than a targeted killing. Towards the film’s end, we are reminded of 
law as bureaucracy and record keeping when Colonel Powell instructs her 
targeteer, ‘You will file your report as a 45% CDE, understood Sant’? And 
when the U.S. drone pilot refuses to fire the weapon unless the collateral 
damage estimate is revised, his astonished superior asks (rhetorically!) 
what he is thinking by ‘throwing the rule book at a Colonel’. The many 
constraining rules and procedures depict military violence as restrained 
and law-full.
13. In the Cabinet Offices Briefing Room, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary 
of State Responsible for Africa asks, ‘Has there ever been a British-led 
drone attach on a city in a friendly country that is not at war? If not, how 
can we sanction it’?
14. Lieutenant Watts, the U.S. airforce drone pilot in the Nevada container, 
relies on the language of rights in an effort not to risk Alia’s life, saying, 
‘Colonel Powell, ma’am, I am the pilot in command. I have the right to 
ask for the CDE [Collateral Damage Estimate] to be run again. I will not 
release my weapon until that happens’.
15. For a useful analysis of courtroom dramas as genre, see Silbey 2001.
16. http://www.bleeckerstreetmedia.com/editorial/eyeinthesky-chain-of-
command 
17. Aspects of the roles played by women in Eye are discussed below.
18. Although the language of ‘planetary jurisdiction’ is specific to the 9/11 
Commission Report, a US foreign policy twinned to global militarization 
and technologies of representation dates from (at least) the Cold War (e.g., 
Virilio 1989 17: Masco 2014).
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19. Spectatorship and virtualisation, Liam Kennedy (2012) highlights, are 
core to visual culture in our time of perpetual war.
20. I am grateful to Shaun McVeigh for this point.
21. Nan Seuffert’s written comments are on file with me.
22. I am grateful to Shaun McVeigh for this point.








attacked-Kenyan-police-station.html. I am grateful to Nan Seuffert for 
drawing this connection to my attention.









29. https://w w w.gov.uk /government/groups/the-permanent-joint-
headquarters 
30. http://www.creech.af.mil/ 
31. https://www.wired.com/2016/04/eye-in-the-sky-modern-war-film/. In 
2009, Jane Mayer reported that the United States government was planning 
‘to commission hundreds more [drones], including new generations of 
tiny “nano” drones, which can fly after their prey like a killer bee through 
an open window’ (Mayer 2009: 5). The implication of Mayer’s report 
was that General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, a private company that 
manufactures the best known drones, the Predator and the Reaper, would 
also be manufacturing the tiny nano drone. With the release of Eye in 
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2016, the probable actual existence and deployments of the tiny drone 
augments the technofetishism so central to the film.
32. Roger Stahl defines militainment as ‘state violence translated into an object 
of pleasurable consumption … this state violence is not of the distant or 
historical variety but rather an impending or current use of force, one 
directly relevant to the citizen’s political life’ (2010: 6).
33. In his analysis of the Situation Room photography, Liam Kennedy makes 
the point that visibility is treated as a species of transparency even as an 
image illustrates an undemocratic and non-transparent exercise of state 
power (2012).
34. In a sound bite, the reporter explains that al-Shabaad is fighting for a 
particular version of ‘Islamic’ rule in the horn of Africa and ‘bitterly resents 
the role of Kenya and Britain in propping up the Somali government’.
35. Eye features in musician and artist David Byrne’s installation on implicit 
bias. In National Public Radio’s report on Byrne’s installation, the role 
of race, religion, and dress in assumptions about terrorism are brought to 
the fore: http://www.npr.org/programs/morning-edition/.
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